Contending With Nationalism and Communism: British Policy Towards Southeast Asia, 1945-65 (Global Conflict and Security since 1945)By Peter LoweContending With Nationalism and Communism provides a lucid, concise analysis of the development of British policy in South -East Asia in the twenty years following the defeat of Japan. The principal themes concern nationalism and communism and how Britain worked to achieve accommodation with nationalist movements while containing communist challenges. It is based on archival and published sources. This is the first study to cover British policy from the final stages of the Pacific War to the culmination of confrontation with Indonesia and escalation in Vietnam in 1965. British ministers and officials are seen as pragmatic and realistic, illustrated in the decisions to grant independence to Burma and Malaya, to support SEATO as a defensive concept, to avoid provoking Communist China, to encourage American involvement while discouraging dangerous American initiatives. The fundamental theme is is one of British assertiveness, extending to the close of the Geneva Conference in 1954, and then of gradual British withdrawal while American power expanded rapidly.
This volume examines the development of British policy in Southeast
Asia during a period of approximately twenty years extending from the
closing stages of the Pacific War to the time when confrontation with
Indonesia over the creation of Malaysia peaked and when military escalation
in Vietnam assumed ominous proportions.1 No serious disagreement
existed between the principal political parties in Britain in 1945
concerning aims in the region; it was essential to restore British authority,
to develop an economic role following the havoc resulting from
Japanese occupation, to recognise the new political forces at work, to
establish cordial relations with the leaders of new political movements,
to help in the attainment of a new stability that would promote the longterm
interests of the West and block communism. The right wing of the
Conservative party wished to delay departure from colonial territories
and the left wing of the Labour party wished to hasten departure but
there was no fundamental divergence in the policies pursued by Labour
and Conservative governments. In opposition Winston Churchill was
free to revel in nostalgia for the old empire, as he deplored Clement
Attlee’s policies in the Indian subcontinent and Burma in 1946–48. In
government, between 1951 and 1955, Churchill followed the same path
as his predecessor and permitted more rapid progress towards independence
in Malaya than that contemplated by Attlee. In the earlier
part of the postwar era Britain was still a major power, responsible for
administering an empire of considerable size and responsible additionally
in 1945–46 for assisting in the restoration of French and Dutch
rule in their colonial possessions. The United States was preoccupied
mainly with Japan and with helping Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang
(KMT) regime in China. There was no desire in Washington to become
involved significantly in Southeast Asia other than stopping the British
2 Contending with Nationalism and Communism
from bullying Thailand and prodding the French and the Dutch into
conciliation in Indochina and Indonesia. By 1950, American policy was
changing in consequence of the onset of the Cold War in Asia, associated
with communist triumph in China and anxiety regarding instability
in Southeast Asia. The Korean War propelled America towards
an assertive approach to block the perceived ambitions of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC), led by Mao Tse-tung. The British approach,
illustrated graphically in Anthony Eden’s sharp exchanges with John
Foster Dulles in 1954, was to dissuade the United States from overreacting
while proceeding with the conclusion of a new defence agreement,
leading to the emergence of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) in 1954–55. The Geneva conference of 1954 was an important
watershed; it was the last occasion on which Britain diverged successfully
from the United States on a major issue and helped to ensure the
adoption of an outcome not favoured in Washington. The Suez crisis in
1956 undermined British influence and its repercussions pushed Harold
Macmillan’s government into endorsing American policy in Vietnam,
particularly when Macmillan was striving to achieve a close working
relationship with John F. Kennedy. However, no British government
would consider committing British troops to intervention in Vietnam.
The last big challenge facing Britain in 1965 was to secure a satisfactory
end to confrontation in Borneo. Britain’s economic predicament convinced
Harold Wilson’s government to terminate long-standing political
and strategic commitments in Asia except for Hong Kong and the
already qualified support for SEATO.
List of Contents
List of Maps
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
The Return of Colonialism, 1945-48
The Communist Challenges in Malaya and Indochina
Two Approaches to Containing Communism: The Colombo Plan and SEATO, 1950-65
Democracy, Communism and Militarism in Burma, 1948-65
Ambivalence and Commitment: Vietnam, 1955-65
Britain, Cambodia and Laos, 1955-65
Britain, Thailand and the Philippines, 1945-65
Britain, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia, 1959-65
Conclusion
Appendix: List of British Officials
Endnotes
Select Bibliography
Index
Author Biography
PETER LOWE is Author of six books and editor or co-editor of an additional three books. A member of staff at the University of Manchester, UK from 1965-2004, most recently as Reader in History and then Honorary Senior Research Fellow, he is also a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
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