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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976: Volume VIII, Vietnam, January - October 1972 có liên quan tới nhận định của phía Mỹ về cuộc tiến công 1972 của ta.
Những chỗ bôi đậm cho thấy trong tháng 1 và 2/1972 phía Mỹ thiên về (nhưng không khẳng định) khả năng ta sẽ mở chiến dịch lớn ở khu vực phía bắc khu phi QS (Trị Thiên) và Tây Nguyên, đặc biệt là hướng Tây Nguyên và hầu như không nhắc đến Đông Nam Bộ. Nhưng đến tháng 3/1972 (trước khi cuộc tiến công mở màn) họ đã tính đến khả năng ta có thể mở đồng thời nhiều chiến dịch lớn ở cả hướng Trị Thiên, Tây Nguyên, Đông Nam Bộ và Bắc Lào.
Document 10: Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Washington, January 29, 1972.
SUBJECT
Vietnam Authorities
Secretary Laird has sent me his views on General Abrams' assessment of the situation in Vietnam. He also advises that he has granted certain broadened air operating authorities requested by General Abrams. (Tab B)
As for the situation, in brief, Abrams believes the North Vietnamese are preparing for major offensive action in the northern half of South Vietnam, particularly in the highlands of Military Region II and Military Region I. The North Vietnamese have substantial forces available and if they employ their 320th Division, which has been brought down to southern Laos, they can develop a 1-1/2 to 1 force advantage in the area. ...
Document 12: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
The situation in Vietnam
The NSC will meet on Vietnam at 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, February 2, 1972. The primary object is to discuss the current situation, ongoing actions to meet the threat and ensure that whatever further steps are needed are in fact implemented.
The Enemy Threat
We face a rapidly increasing enemy threat to South Vietnam. Specifically, the enemy has:
-Infiltrated 20% more men than at this time last year. Infiltration this year will be the greatest since Tet 1968, although well below that level.
-Moved in at least three NVA divisions to threaten the northern region of South Vietnam. For example, the 320th NVA division is now in Laos, positions to launch an attack on the highlands of MR 2.
-Accelerated the movement of supplies into Laos and started preparing for battle in South Vietnam. While the overall flow of supplies into Vietnam is still below last year's level, it is rapidly rising and will be sufficient to support offensive activities.
Based on these preparations, the intelligence community is convinced that the enemy will launch significant offensive operations in northern South Vietnam combined with increased activity in other areas. It seems likely that the attacks will start on our about February 15 and could continue for one or two months. The enemy clearly intends to make a major effort timed to precede and coincide with your trip to Peking. His purpose is to weaken your position in talke there if he can and to rekindle domestic opposition in the U.S. ...
Document 13: National Security Council Meeting (this is a meeting attended by President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Moorer, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and others)
Washington, February 2, 1972 (Footnote: ...The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording here specifically for
this volume. ...)
...[During discussion of whether to attack areas of North Vietnam just north of the DMZ where there is a major buildup of NVA forces and supplies]
Laird: Mr. President, I'd just like to make a comment about what we can do. Because I think that's the important question as to what we can
do as far as the offensive is concerned. The offensive, I think, if it takes place, will be in the B-3 Front. I think that that's indicated by all of the activities that that's where the attack will be made. Now, we've got to concentrate on limiting that attack, it seems to me, and do everything we can with all the airpower we have, because this inasmuch it gives the South Vietnamese a much greater advantage than any kid of artillery or anything else the other side can have. The activities in the North will not have anything to do with the B-3 activtities because evry bit of logistic support, if the activities that are going to take place in the next three weeks have already gone through these passes and is already in place. Anything that needs to come down to support that operation now won't be available until March of April. So everything that for this attack that we're concerned about is in place and has been, including the people that are involved, as far as the B-3 Front is concerned. ....
Document 18: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Washington, February 8, 1972
SUBJECT
Secretary Laird's Daily Report on Southeast Asia Situation
Attached is the first of Secretary Laird's daily reports on the situation in Southeast Asia which have been instituted to keep you abreast of actions related to stepped-up enemy activity. The report confirms the following:
-Delineations of numbers, types, and general location of air sorties which were conducted on February 6. The report indicates a total of 292 air stories were executed; 210 tac air, 33 B-52, 20 gunship and 29 non-attack sorties.
Secretary Laird reports the following actions with respect to operating authorities which you have approved:
...
(10) General Abrams will conduct a sustained all-out, forty-eight hour air effort against enemy targets in the B-3 Front commencing at 6:00 p.m. Washington time on February 9. All air assets in the theater will be concentrated on this effort with the exception of minimum essential support missions around Long Tieng and absolutely essential diversions for other unforeseen critical developments. The third aircraft carrier has been moved to Yankee Station to support this all-out effort which will commence Wednesday evening, our time, weather permitting.
...
Document 35: Message from the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Abrams) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer) and the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain)
Saigon, March 8, 1972 1155Z
69866. Deliver upon receipt. Subject: COMUSMACV personal appraisal of the enemy/friendly situation (C).
1. (TS) In view of the growing intelligence picture, I am today submitting my personal appraisal of the overall situation as it now stands and the requirements necessary to effectively meet this situation. There are five distinctly identifiable and interrelated threats that must be considered and countered. the five threats are enemy forces in the northwestern portion of MR1 and near the DMZ which for ease of reference will be called the DMZ area; the enemy forces in the Pleiku/Kontum area which will be referred to hereafter as the B-3 Front; the enemy forces in the Chup/Mimot/Snoul area of Cambodia opposite MR3 which will be referred to as COSVN; the enemy forces n the PDJ/Long Tieng area which will be referred to as the Long Tieng area; and the enemy logisitcs offensive moving down the Laotian panhandle which will be referred to as the logistics offensive. I will first summarize the intelligence pertaining to each of the five threats, discuss their interrelationship, present my concept for the employment of US air power against the threat, and finally present the authorities needed to counter the threat.
...7. (TS) Interrelationshp of the Five Threats. Early in the enemy buildup, we had expected that the enemy offensive against the B-3 Front would preced action against the DMZ area. This has not materialized and it now appears that the enemy is capable of concurrent offensive action in all five threat areas. The most salient interrelationship among concurrent offensives in the five threat areas would be the sudden demand for air power needed to support each. In fact, the competing demands for air power already exist as we attempt to counter the enemy preparations in each threat area. Two other interrelationships are pertinent, offensive action by COSVN forces could create a threat to MR3 that would complicate the JGS decision to move airborne and marine reserve forces to MR1 or MR2. This emphasizes the need for preemptive actions against COSVN forces. We are applying air power against these forces, and as mentioned in my assessment of 6 March, III Corps plans to initiate an offensive against them on 9 March. Finally, since virtually everything the enemy does has an associated goal of influencing public opinion, the execution of concurrent attacks in four separate geographical areas would portray an impression of omnipotence that would be beneficial to his purposes. ...
Document 42: Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Lairs to President Nixon
Washington, March 14, 1972.
SUBJECT
Request for Operating Authorities to Counter the North Vietnamese Threat
...
Situation in SEA
The Chairman's assessment of the current enemy dispositions is consistent with other available intelligence. The NVA have concentrated their forces so that they are capable of launching multiregimental assaults simultaneously in northern Military Region (MR) 1, the Central Highlands, western MR 3, and at Long Tieng in northern Laos. It is entirely possible that the NVA may be able to achieve a short-term victory on one or more of these potential battlefields. On the other hand, I do not foresee, on the basis of informaiton now available, the North Vietnamese being able to overwhelm friendly forces to the extent that the progress of Vietnamization is reversed. ...